Theranos gets $100 million funding - is it what it seems?

Few things surprise me in the funding of startups anymore - when you see a juicer that gets $90 million that's pretty much the end of shock as to what gets money - but this week saw my jaw drop on the funding news front as Theranos, the supposed blood testing company, received a further $100 million. This scoop was from Lydia Ramsey at Business Insider, and follows John Carreyrou of the Wall Street Journal who did fantastic investigative journalism on Theranos over the last few years. Theranos are pretty much the poster child for what's wrong in tech investing. Here's a quick summary of why not to invest in Theranos:

• The technology never even vaguely met the wildly exaggerated initial claims
• Sued by investors to the tune of >$100 million for fraud (settled out of court)
• Sued by biggest customer for around $140 million for fraud (settled out of court)
• CEO/Founder banned by the federal government from running their main business line 
• Sued by Arizona AG for inaccurate blood tests on >100,000 patients
• Never/rarely subject their results to independent third party scrutiny
• Placed the safety of patients at risk
• Ongoing US Attorney and SEC investigations

Essentially, they're not "good actors" in any sense of the word - they've had to be sued by both investors (nearly unheard of) and customers, and risked the lives of patients with their blood tests. Why would you give them money? I don't think I'm alone in my initial stunned reaction, from what I see and hear the VC community is also pretty shocked by this one, even they don't want to go throwing good money after something this bad. After a day or so though, I began to think about it more, and I've come to the conclusion that it's unlikely that Theranos will ever see that full $100 million, and instead it's a savvy play for IP from a private equity firm.

The history

I've written fairly extensively on Theranos, but have not posted in over a year because I thought they were pretty much dead and the story was on hold until they went into bankruptcy or criminal prosecutions began. More fool me. A quick summary for those who haven't been following - Theranos claimed to have revolutionary blood testing technology that would identify many diseases from a  single fingerstick drop of blood, and raised >$750 million from VC (mostly non-traditional for biotech ones), had a board full of ex-government bigwigs including current Secretary of Defense Mattis, and had a Stanford dropout young CEO who the press loved. In the end it turned out to be a fraud, the technology could not do what they claimed, used heavy handed legal threats against whistleblowers and media, had to refund nearly $5 million to 76,000 patients for inaccurate blood tests, had the CEO/founder banned from operating a clinical lab for two years by the government, and eventually were sued by both customers and investors for huge amounts of money (estimated at over $100 million in settlements so far). There are ongoing US Attorney and SEC investigations, and likely other federal criminal investigations too. Having gone through some rounds of layoffs amounting to over half the company, everyone was just waiting for the bankruptcy filing and then the news of this funding dropped.

The investor

The investment comes from a group who often invest in 'distressed' companies - Fortress Investment Group LLC - that is they look for bargains and drive hard deals with companies desperate because they have nowhere else to go. There's a good history of the company here, and if you want to see a financial company where the executives make ungodly sums of money whether they succeed or fail, this is it. The five top executives took home near $1.7 billion just before they IPO'd in 2007, after which the stock plummeted by around 75% (at one point by 97%). 

The group had a turnaround earlier this year when SoftBank agreed to buy them for $3.3 billion, no doubt giving another payday to the executives at the company. For those who aren't aware, SoftBank runs the world's largest investment fund, the $100 billion "Vision Fund", and have made enormous purchases and investments such as to chip maker ARM Holdings for $32 billion, and Uber for $10 billion.

This is not a company where they invest in good social works or for the sake of humanity, they're in this deal because they smell money.

The investment

$100 million is a lot of money, even for a sizable company like Theranos. Seeing that kind of investment in a fraudulent company raises anger in those who have diligently worked to develop tech based on shoestring budgets, especially if they've been passed over for funding because they're told it's not as advanced as Theranos' smoke and mirrors pitches had people believing the state-of-the-art was. I'm not sure it's quite what it appears at first glance though, so let's take a look at what we know. Here are the key quotes from the WSJ article:

Theranos Inc. told its investors this week that it has secured a $100 million loan from Fortress Investment Group LLC

The loan from Fortress is collateralized by Theranos’s patent portfolio and the deal grants Fortress warrants for 4% of the company’s equity

The loan is “subject to achieving certain product and operational milestones,” 

This leaves the possibilities for what has happened wide open, so assuming that Fortress are savvy and seeing a deal here, I'm going to make some guesses as to what's happening.

• This is a loan, not a traditional investment such as for equity or for convertible debt. In the event of bankruptcy this takes precedence over all other investors such as shareholders - they get paid back before anyone else, so it's safer than equity investing. 
• It's a loan on certain terms and if they don't meet those terms then the company's IP (patents etc) likely become the property of Fortress. (USPTO quick search turns up 115 patents, smaller than I would have expected). They don't just get paid back first, they get the choice assets, likely the only part of the company that has value. What's the value of that IP? Have they evaluated that it could be sold to another biotech firm such as Roche for >$100 million?
• The money is conditional upon reaching milestones - that is, they don't just get handed $100 million to do with as they please, it's going to be metered out in multiple tranches if and only if they hit targets. These targets will be various steps along the way to "receive FDA approval for Zika virus test" and possibly include "not to be sued by investors, customers, or face criminal charges from any federal agencies". Basically, Fortress dole out the kid's allowance very carefully, and will have chosen the trigger points carefully.
• Fortress get warrants on 4% of stock - this means they can choose to buy up to 4% of the company stock at a set price, at a later date. We don't know what that price is, but you can expect it will be at $100 million or most likely much lower. If Theranos pulls a rabbit out of the hat and makes a success of things, becoming a multi-billion dollar company, then Fortress get to own a piece of it at a discount.

So Fortress have arranged a deal where they don't have to put the full amount in up-front, but are still ahead of any other investor, get to own the only valuable part of the company if it goes wrong (the IP), and get discounted stock in the company if it, through some miracle, succeeds. With the right milestones and triggers, this could be a deal where Fortress win no matter what happens, and may actually come out better should Theranos fail. I wonder if Fortress have essentially arranged a deal to make sure that all the good parts are gone by the time everyone else reaches the bankruptcy auction.

Why would Theranos take such a deal? Well, because they have to choice - it's this or bankruptcy.

The outcome

Can the technology succeed? Putting aside who would trust their personal health to a company with Theranos' reputation, possibly, but there's something to look at that is pretty damning as to what is happening internally. From WSJ:

In May, Theranos announced in a press release that it had hired Cass Grandone, a former Abbott Diagnostics executive, to head its product development. Ms. Holmes was quoted in the press release as saying that Mr. Grandone’s leadership would be critical to the company. However, Mr. Grandone resigned last month after just six months on the job, according to a person familiar with his departure.

When someone like this gets brought in, it's to save the product. They get given incentives and bonuses that make it very, very worth their while to see things to completion. If he's leaving after only 6 months to me it says either the technology can't make it to product, or the company is screwed up so badly that even good tech won't succeed (read: clashes with unreasonable CEO). It could be either, or both, but is irrelevant - that Grandone walked is a very bad sign for Theranos. (At least he didn't feel so much pressure he committed suicide.)

So what will happen? Who knows where this bizarre story will end, however I would not put stock in Theranos succeeding - IMO a demoralized company with technology at best no better than the competition, a CEO/founder likely to still believe she can succeed and willing to take any deal to avert bankrupty, with potential for criminal charges and further lawsuits hanging over their heads, will not be a company focused on a world-beating product. 

Perhaps Fortress will walk away from this with all the IP for $10 or $20 million, and leave the rotting carcass for everyone else who put in >$750 million. Quite the deal for Fortress if they can pull it off.

Recent Investments in Consumer Ultrasound

Earlier this month a consumer ultrasound company received a large series B funding round, taking in a further $23m to bring their haul to around $40m in total. It wasn't uBeam, it was UltraHaptics in the UK, who are using ultrasound to induce sensations and feelings at a distance (Haptics means 'relating to the sense of touch'). Think touching a 'key' on your phone when the screen vibrates or there's a buzz, even though it's not feeling like a key, the presence of some form of feedback tricks your brain and lets you know something has happened.  

It's likely a good complement to AR/VR and while it won't ever feel like solid objects or real things, the fact that there can be some form of feedback is a huge benefit. Imagine feeling something on your fingers as you touch a virtual keyboard, or sensations on other parts of your body as signals to interact with the virtual world around you. 

From the UltraHaptics pictures, it looks like they are using Murata MA40S4S car parking sensors (at least that's what they show), just many of them together in a square array (it's what's under his hands, just in front of the laptop). These are commercial off-the-shelf parts, and not ideal for a phased array, but unlike uBeam who also appear to be using them, are unlikely to be working at a power level where this becomes a safety issue. An array like this can be controlled to send beams in directions controlled digitally, but also as a receiver to allow imaging of the surroundings.

UltraHaptics seems to be working with the automotive industry according to the TechCrunch article, which surprised me, as there are fewer options within the car for that kind of feedback. What there is more demand for is sensing, both of passenger location within the car, and sensing close in around the car at low speed such as during parking. Other sensing systems such as LIDAR aren't always best close in, at a few meters or less, and ultrasound can do that job - essentially it's a high-fidelity version of the reverse sensors many cars have these days. I do wonder if they've found that there's another more lucrative application for their technology.

Another company in the ultrasound haptics space is Emerge, based in LA, and they have to be pleased that large investments are going into this space. Interestingly, Emerge has been on uBeam's radar, with rumours of a 'Cease and Desist' being sent their way for having the audacity to hire an engineer previously employed at uBeam (one wonders if the other 19 or so companies now employing the entire first group of uBeam engineers will also receive such letters). It's hilarious that anyone would be naive enough to think in California that a non-compete or restrictive practice could be placed on the employment of any engineer, and might indicate some desperation on their part. With Energous covering the IP space in wireless power (RF and ultrasound) as well as multiple applications such as communications, apparently few uBeam patents in the pipeline, and Emerge and UltraHaptics cleaning up in the haptics and possibly imaging spaces, that there is anywhere for uBeam to pivot to if (when?) the wireless power market proves unattainable.

Overall, I'm glad to see investment in this area - there are challenges for these companies but definitely some interesting opportunities - but also that there are engineering companies out there just quietly getting on with the job of building technology and delivering products.

Raising Capital for a Startup: Convertible Debt

You have an idea, it's awesome and will change the world, something like a juicer or a toaster oven. Right now only you can see the potential, and you just need some funding to get started. You can use savings, but ultimately anything that's going to be amazing needs cash either to scale, or to get to market quicker - how do you raise that money? 

You can go to a bank for a loan, but they'll ask about sales, revenue, and profit, and seeing as you have none, they won't talk to you. So instead you go to an angel  (a rich individual or small group of rich individuals) or VC company, and offer them equity (shares) in your company in return for the money - but you still don't have anything, so how can they value your company to determine how much stock they should own? It's a large and expensive exercise to work that out (and you have no money to pay that with), at the end of which you may not think it's fair or viable for your needs.  

So with no revenue, product, idea of actual value, how can you reasonably raise money? A common way this is done is Convertible Debt. Convertible Debt is a hybrid between a loan (debt) and equity (shares) that tries to keep things simple in terms of the paperwork to get going, and puts off the tricky bit about valuation until later when there's more information to base that on.

Here's how Convertible Debt works - the company and investor agree on an investment amount, say $100,000, which the company will use to further the business/product. This is usually after a few rounds of meetings and presentations, where the founder has shown a basic pitch deck, presented a plan and a vision, and been vetted to some degree by the investor. Each Convertible Debt note can be different, I'm presenting a common version, but expect every one to have its own idiosyncrasies.

This money is given as a loan, same as with a bank loan, complete with an interest rate and repayment period - for example it might be at 3% interest, with a 2 year repayment timeframe. At the end of those two years the debt, along with interest (which has been accumulating all that time), is to be repaid in full. There are no debt payments made during that time, unlike a regular bank loan. 

That's pretty straightforward for a loan, but there's the equity part - if there is a "funding event" at some point in that 2 years (usually defined as a certain total amount of money raised) then the loan converts instead to equity (shares). Basically it starts as debt, then converts to equity, hence convertible debt.

How does the 'convertible' part happen? At some point a valuation of the company can be performed - but here the company has (say) 2 years of work behind it, perhaps a product prototype or early customers, and the VC firm putting in the Series A money (sometimes called "institutional money") has the capability and reputation to place that value on the company.

So, let's say that $100,000 of Convertible Debt was put into a company that a VC later values at $10,000,000 pre-money, puts in $2,000,000 for a $12,000,000 post valuation - that converts based on the pre-money valuation (usually, but not always) so those original investors get around 1% ($100k/$10m, ignoring interest) of the $12m company. They gained about 20% ($120k) on a pretty risky bet over 2 years, so it's a decent return but not earth shattering considering they basically made the company possible, were likely to lose everything, and the VC now has ~17%. 

This is a little unfair to the original investor, so this is why there is also a "discount" or "kicker" in the Convertible Debt agreement, where there is a discount on the price, often around 20%, so they get a bit more. With a 20% discount, they'd be getting 1.25% of the company ($100k/$8m) - now they've made a 50% return in value which is better, but still not that great, especially when that money isn't liquid and they still have the risk of future rounds of funding and it all going wrong. If the company happens to go stellar with that initial money, say a $100m valuation, then the investor gets an even smaller % of the company - that's a great deal for the founders and VCs!

Sophisticated investors in Convertible Debt often ask for a cap on the note (since it's debt, the term 'note' is often used for Convertible Debt). In the case above, they might have a note with a cap of $2m - in that case if the valuation goes over $2m at the Series A, the conversion of debt to equity is calculated at the cap - so it's ~5% ($100k/$2m) and now they've got a (paper) 500% gain, which will make them much happier. (Whether cap and discount both apply is down to the details of the note, sometimes it's just one of them).

So Convertible Debt has the benefits of keeping things simple in the legal papers (it can be done in a couple of pages), puts off the tricky aspect of valuing a company, and allows for the upside of equity in a growing company if things should take off. This is why Convertible Debt is a common financing vehicle early in a company, often in what's called the 'Seed Round'. 

What are typical terms? Usually these notes are for amounts in the $10k or $100k ranges (by definition it's a small company trying to prove things out, with a 'non-institutional investor'), but sometimes go into the millions. Interest rates are usually nominal, say 1 to 5%. The discount is also variable, but 15 to 30% is not uncommon. The term is a bit trickier, how long to make that? Well, you need to be actually able to do something with the money, and then with your new prototype or product go to a VC and the process of raising a Series A. Conventional wisdom tells you that if all goes great, a Series A raise takes 3 months, and it generally doesn't go well so assume it's 6 months. Basically, however long it's going to take you to get to something worthwhile, plus 6 months, is how long you want. For example, if you think it's going to be 9 months to a year to get to prototype, don't make your note term shorter than 18 months, and you probably want to give a little headroom in there for things going wrong. I've rarely seen a single year as a term, but I'm more a hardware person and those projects take longer, with the bulk in the 18 month to 2 year range - longer than that is rare as running a company for 3 years on convertible can be tough. Terms can also be conditional - that is they change with certain events - for example the discount may increase at certain points during the term of the note, starting say at 15% on a two year note and increasing by 2.5% each year. A founder may offer these terms to entice the investor to give a longer term, or the investor may want to encourage alacrity on the part of the company.

Most times both investor and company assume that it will be a clear situation of successful funding and conversion, or that the company has gone under, but if it's in limbo or limping along as often happens, things can be uncertain. What happens if things go wrong?

The most common way is for the term to expire and there to have been no funding event - the investor is due the loan back with interest, but no institutional investor agrees the company is worth funding, and we assume there is no money in the company to repay it. What happens then is the same as with any debt - debtor must come to an agreement with lender as to next steps, and this could be anything from bankruptcy to a renegotiation of the debt. With smaller amounts, both sides might just ignore it and pretend it didn't happen, with legal costs likely to outweight the investment amount, but the larger the amount the more an agreement needs to happen. Bankruptcy doesn't make sense, usually, as driving the company under ensures no chance of future success, and they are unlikely to have significant assets to liquidate to pay the investor back. It makes more sense for the two parties to come to an agreement, for example extending the term for another year while increasing the discount by 10%, and so it's usually recommended that if money isn't already in, start talking to your Convertible Debt note holders at least 3 months prior to term about what happens next.

Regardless, any institutional investor coming in for a Series A will want that paperwork cleared up before their money goes in, as they don't want a lawsuit or trouble later on.  This leads to some interesting situations where the Convertible Debt investor can start to demand beneficial terms from the company and hold up the Series A, or the company can demand the note holder give concessions like the discount rate or they won't go ahead (it's a "give me what I want or I shoot my company" tactic but I've seen it work). In those cases, it's down to bad blood between Convertible Debt investor and founder, and if it wasn't before it certainly is after.

One interesting permutation I've never seen play out is if a company does a convertible note between institutional rounds - for example between Series A and B when there was an original valuation and equity investors. It's odd, but it does happen, as LA Business Journal's Garrett Reim notes this is a route uBeam opted to follow when they took an (up to) $15m Convertible Debt round in July 2015 after a ~$10m Series A in summer 2014. This leads to a lot of possible weirdness that may or may not occur depending on how uBeam's fundraising for their Series B (which they must be deep into, now nearly 2 years from last fundraise) plays out.

First weirdness is that the Series A VC investors, who all get Preferred Stock that guarantees them paid out first from any money, are very unusually in the queue behind the convertible debt for being repaid, as debt always takes priority in any liquidation. This puts the lead investor in the position of desperately wanting a conversion from debt to Common Stock so they can take priority again.

Next is that the convertible round size was likely based on the then valuation of the company, with the expectation it would rise in the time between loan origination and maturity. If the situation arises where the Series B is a down round (lower valuation) than the Series A, or even similar, then the Convertible Debt investors will end up taking a huge % of the company even before the shares of the new Series B investor dilute the company further.

Lastly is that if the company had a valuation prior to the Convertible Debt investment, then there is the assumption that there is actually some value there, be it product, customers, IP like patents, or even remaining cash in the bank from the original Series A. A Convertible Debt investor at the note maturity may decide that liquidation is the best outcome for them, especially if they can get paid off first (perhaps they know the company has more cash in the bank than they are owed), and they do not think the company has much of a future. This can lead to an acrimonious situation as the investor plays 'hardball' with the company - that's not going to happen at the $100k level, but go past $1m and things are different. An element of that played out with Theranos when one of their investors, PFM, sued for their $96m investment back claiming fraud, when they know Theranos had $200m in the bank - basically taking the money before lawsuits and time removed the potential for any return.

Overall, Convertible Debt is a well understood way of raising money in the very early stages of a company, with simple terms and paperwork, but it can lead to some very difficult situations should it not convert at the end of the term.  There are other options and variations, such as SAFE, but in the interests of simplicity, I'm focusing just on that.

Update: Interesting Techcrunch article on the issues that SAFE and convertible note rounds can cause. Further reading on the matter - some key quotes that emphasize what I wrote above:

Why is this troubling? Because it has become more common for VC funds to pass on investing in deals altogether, solely because the waterfall of notes would consume too much equity. If outstanding notes prevent a new lead investor from meeting their fund’s required ownership targets without triggering a complete company recapitalization, a null set of equity distribution possibilities may arise.

In these cases, the only valuations that makes sense for a Series B lead investor force the dreaded “down round.”

How Do These Keep Becoming Things?

Two weeks ago the Consumer Electronics Show (CES) gave its yearly insight into the tech we'll all be getting to buy in the coming months and years. Companies reveal major products like cool new TVs with more pixels and better colours, the latest phones, new processors and things we actually use - and then there are the more bizarre things which continue to show that for every joke idea an engineer can come up with, there's a marketing manager who is dumb enough to run with it.

This year had a high bar to try to beat the previous competition, with the likes of Juicero and the June Oven, but the tech world rose to the challenge and brought us toothbrushes with AI, mirrors to tell you that you are not the fairest of them all, and my favorite being the smart hairbrush to help you brush better. All these paled in my reaction, however, to the incredible wonder that was forwarded to me today - Moodo, the smart home fragrance box.

Moodo is an electronic air freshener, programmable with a variety of scents, and you can even create your own scent with it and then share with others. Who wouldn't want to create their own 'Gardens of Isphahan' or 'Cozzzy' scents and share them? It's an amazing package, and only took three years from concept to delivery (well, promised delivery), where you just pop your Keurig style pods in (yay for the consumable business model!), and use the wifi connection to your smartphone app (of course) to dial in the aroma of your dreams from anywhere! Who wouldn't want one?

Now, at least they aren't asking for $700 or $1500 for it, the Indiegogo campaign seems to have it listed around $230 retail for each unit (only moderately outrageous but still pretty expensive for an air freshener), but only $140 or so if you are an Indiegogo 'early bird'. It's the $20 per set of four fragrances for the consumables where the money likely is, following the printer model of giving the printer itself away at cost or small profit, but charging heavily for the ink. Except a printer is actually useful.

Normally I'd say I can see the pitch to the VCs, who really weren't paying attention to the product but saw the consumable sales, the hockey stick revenue growth, and the smartphone/wifi/app nature of it and the cheque was written - but in this case it may not be so ridiculous. The parent company seems to be Agan Aroma/ADAMA Agricultural Solutions which produce chemicals and components for the fragrance industry, and so if they can sell their products direct to consumers at whatever x000% markup compared to industrial purchasers then it's a good deal. So this is something that really seems like a pointless product, but you can understand why the company pursued it. What I can't understand though, is why a company that supposedly has between 1000 and 5000 employees (according to LinkedIn) would use an Indiegogo campaign to get $50,000 of funding to promote it? Seems an odd mix of approaches, and I don't follow the combination of bootstrapping and larger company product promoter. I'll keep following the Indiegogo numbers, as of now 44 people have put in $8,726, let's see if it hits the goal by the end of the month.

Before I leave this topic, there's an update to the Juicero story from the first "How is this a Thing?" Fortune reports that Juicero's new CEO has slashed the price on their product from $700 to $400, after he remembered his Economics 101 class where someone said that you sell slightly more of a useless thing at $400 than at $700. Or was it that you take a loss on each but then make it up in volume? Still, I laughed at the report saying:

Dunn and his team made the decision to cut the cost now after running a test on Black Friday. They priced the machine for less than $400 and doubled their current number of users in one day.

Great, you went from 1 unit sold to 2, (though maybe that was the new CEO's granny feeling sorry for him). Still, you have to wonder about the journalist who didn't follow up on this obvious statement and ask "How many have you sold in total then?". Even if they got a "Can't release sales figures" answer, it takes it from a marketing piece to something more akin to journalism. Come on reporters, how can you build credibility if you can't even take a swing at softballs like that?

Consider the Lily

Once again there's a ton to write about - Brexit, Theranos, Energous, Erin Griffith's article on Ethics in Silicon Valley, and recent developments with uBeam, but a combination of work plus, hunting for a house, buying a house, getting contractors in, and moving, are eating up all my time. Hopefully next month things will be a little more settled and I'll be back to writing more like a post a week.

In the meantime, I wanted to cover the startup story of the moment, Lily Robotics. Lily is a drone company, promising a simple to use drone (throw it in the air, that's it), that follows you and uses a superb camera to take great videos and stills without a controller - ideal for sports enthusiasts to create videos of themselves doing cool stuff. It looks fantastic, with great demo videos and a strong demand. They raised $1 million in seed funding in mid-2014, and then in mid-2015 started taking pre-orders following some amazing videos and marketing - its pre-order list reached 60,000, at over $500 each, for around $34 million in pre-sales. At the end of 2015 they then raised a further $14 million in VC (no surprises - who wouldn't invest with pre-orders like that!)

Units were supposed to ship to customers in Feb 2016, but that was delayed until summer 2016 - no surprises as hardware is hard, give the newbies a break. Then it was delayed again, this time until December 2016 (time-to-carrot of around 6 months), but once again that date came and went, until suddenly last week they simply closed down with a message to their pre-customers that they were sorry, they couldn't manage to make it, but refunds were on offer. A sad tale, a startup that bit off more than it could chew, and ultimately had to close but sought to return the money to the customers and make them right. Sad until it became public that the same day they shut down, they were sued by the San Francisco DA for misleading business practices and false advertising.

I'll leave the other details to The Register, sUAS News, and the EEV Blog, and hone in on a couple of the most interesting points in this case. Remember that one of the key parts of fundraising is to get VCs to think that there are huge numbers of customers out there for your product, and so once you have 'traction', that they want to invest (de-risked is a term used, others simply wonder why you need a VC once you have customers and profits). If you plan on 'hacking' the system to get the VC money, then you aim to get customers - but what if you have no product to sell? Then go with pre-orders! Show the customer an imaginary future product you plan to make, play up the 'plucky little startup' card, and before you know it you've got $34m in sales and VC's knocking down your door, giving you all the money and time you need to make the product and get it to your customer.

That would be the (mostly) legal way to do it, tell pre-customers it's a planned product, tell them what you are showing them is "hoped for" or "aspirational" and do your best to hit it. Or you could simply show them a faked demo and video and hope you've got time to make it a reality by the date delivery is due - 'fake it til you make it' - and this is what the SFDA is claiming Lily did. In effect, it's a variation on what it appears Theranos and others did, except faking the demos to customers, not to investors (who are still likely defrauded, if this is true).

The customers were led to believe the company had more than it did through their promotional video of the Lily in action, however all was not what it seemed. From the SFDA complaint:

Lily Robotics did not have a single Lily Camera prototype that had all of the features advertised in the Promotional Video. Instead, its co-founders Balaresque and Bradlow, who were present during the filming, brought several prototypes to use during the filming. Some, which looked good on the outside but were not fully functional, were used only for “beauty shots.” Others had some functionality but did not look like the product being advertised. Some were able to film video but even those were merely Lily Camera prototypes with GoPro-branded cameras mounted on them.

This is an important point as it highlights something I've seen happen and I think is more prevalent than most want to believe - showing mockups as working devices, claiming many features and achievements in the product, yet not revealing that not only are they not currently available simultaneously in the same product, but that they may even be mutually exclusive. The analogy would be to claim that your company's new aircraft can fly at 90,000 feet, at Mach 1, with a range of 5000 miles, carrying a 100,000 lb load and leading people to believe it can do all at the same time, when that is impossible. It can be done to investors, though they should have the resources and experience to vet such claims, so let's do it to consumers instead - they're gullible and good natured, let's fleece them! 

Of course, I'm being cruel to Lily here, founders never think like that. They're all starry-eyed idealists just looking to follow their dreams and change the world, at worst you can say they are true-believers who wanted to make it all happen, but their reach exceeded their grasp. Let's forgive them, they tried and failed, but at least they tried. 

And then you read excerpts of emails from a Lily founder talking about their demo video:

Are you sure that the GoPro lens does not create a unique deformation/pattern on the image? I am worried that a lens geek could study our images up close and detect the unique GoPro lens footprint. But I am just speculating here: I don’t know much about lenses but I think we should be extremely careful if we decide to lie publicly.

The founder was worried that smart people would find out the demo was faked, and explicitly and in writing admits that they know they are lying. It's the equivalent of being found at the murder scene, covered in blood and carrying an axe, with a signed letter about how you have to be careful if you decide to kill someone with an axe. Despite knowing it was lying and fraudulent, they decided to go ahead with it anyway. Why? Because the funding 'game' is structured to incentivize exaggeration, fabrication, and lying, and to punish honesty. Honesty doesn't get you funded, lying does. When there's millions of dollars at stake (amounts that people kill for), why wouldn't someone tell a few lies, especially when if they succeed, no-one will ever know? And that part is critical - they didn't think they'd get caught, and why would they? How many startup founders have you heard of going to jail for this kind of thing?

A further question that springs to mind is why the VC firm that invested after the pre-sales didn't spot this during their due diligence. Surely they learned that the promo video didn't match what was shown? If they didn't, they were either lied to and also defrauded, or it smacks of incompetence if they missed it. If they did find it, then it's even worse, because they're then complicit in the deception. Faced with being labelled incompetent, fraudsters, or themselves defrauded, I wonder how long before the VC in question joins in the complaint against Lily and sues.

Which then brings the next question - who gets paid back first? Normally in liquidation the VCs get pain off first (preferred stock), but if there is debt then that has to be paid first. In suing to get back their $15m the VCs will have to wait behind the customers' $34m of refunds (who themselves are behind a $4m bank loan) - thus surprising the investors that for once, they aren't at the front of the line. This is something I expect we'll see more of later this year, from companies where debt and convertible debt are sitting ahead of the institutional investors. It will be interesting to see how the VC community reacts to these new circumstances, and how they explain it to their LPs.

As for the customers and their refunds? Apparently there is over $25m in the company accounts, with the accounts now frozen other than to pay employees and debts, so once there is at least a chance customers will get some money back. Glad to see consumer protections working, while we still have them that is...

More Things That Just Shouldn't Be

A few weeks ago I wrote about Juicero, the "Keurig for Juice", and how despite it being a $700 juicer that required $120 million in funding to realise, there were reasons that an investor would put money into it (dumb reasons, but justifiable dumb reasons). Now it's the turn of "June", the toaster oven. To quote the company:

June is a modern appliance company dedicated to bringing intelligence to the tools you use in the kitchen. Our first product, the June Intelligent Oven, allows everyone to discover the joy of cooking at home by enabling precision cooking and restaurant quality performance on your countertop. The June Intelligent Oven's unique features and brilliant design put an end to guesswork and pave the way for faster, better cooking. Our team of designers, hardware and software engineers is committed to transforming the kitchen experience.

Now, apart from the fact that the joy of cooking is the constant improvement and learning through experience to produce tasty food from imperfect ingredients and tools through skill, it's a nice idea. Maybe they can help the average Joe who doesn't have time to learn to cook prepare quick and nutritious food at home rather than dining out or eating salt and sugar laden pre-packaged meals. Looking at Target and Amazon, the price ranges for most toaster ovens are in the the $50 to $150 range, with the highest rated top-of-the-line ovens going for about $225, so a superior oven may go for $300 to be competitive. 

What does the "June" retail for? $1495 (yes, one thousand four hundred and ninety five dollars).

So what do you get for this $1250, or 500%, premium over the best of the rest? Well it comes with a camera that recognizes your food, and then uses its "intelligence" to cook it to perfection, all the while sending you updates via your phone, letting you know it's ready. Of course, it's got that "Apple look" so that's worth a premium too, but that's about as far as the innovation goes. 

And what did it take to produce this masterpiece oven? According to Crunchbase, near $30 million (yes, thirty million dollars), and from their own website, it looks like June has near 50 people working for them. Interestingly, of those 50, I only count around 6 who are potentially involved in hardware design. It's no surprise, then, to hear that the actual hardware design was outsourced to Ammunition (who designed the Lyft logo). Yes, June didn't even design the hardware, and likely just gave Ammunition a list of key features needed without remembering to include "and a Bill of Materials of no more than $100". That, combined with the founders who are software and not hardware people, is probably why nobody said "Um. This is going to be way more expensive than the competition and not deliver substantially improved performance in any area, maybe we should rethink this."

Even the company itself is really struggling to push its virtues - the website uses this as one of the leading quotes from a review in the Wall Street Journal:

The June Intelligent Oven is an Internet-connected countertop system that can recognize foods and automatically cook them for you.

Wow, I have to get myself one of those! An oven that cooks! Amazing! The co-founder then goes on to really sell it well in a Techcrunch article:

“It’s always surrounding your food with hot air,” Bhogal said. “What’s cooked in the corner will always taste like what’s cooked the middle. We spent a lot of time adding precise temperature controls, and that’s not usually seen in this space. We spent a lot of time fine-tuning the cavity. We used a cavity which helps with heat, we fine tuned our insulation, and even the door itself.”

So basically it acts like every other convection oven, but - and here's the real key differentiator - there was a team of Silicon Valley startup engineers who spent lots of time fine tuning components. Yep, that'll make your food taste better and your wallet hurt less. (BTW, the engineers who make ovens actually do spend time working on things like that, they just know they're on a budget)

And this is both why this product is ridiculous, and why a large portion of the world looks at Silicon Valley with contempt. This product is not about the customer, or serving an unmet need. It's about serving the egos and notion of self-worth of a couple of people in the top % of education and income. The customer doesn't care how much time you spent fine tuning things, what the technology is, or how much you need to believe you're changing the world - what they care about is a product that solves their problem, makes their life easier, gets things done faster, all at a reasonable price. That's it. While the privileged few can worry about their feelings of self-worth, most people just need to pay the bills and get through the day as best they can.

It's why the likes of Uber succeed and despite their sometimes dubious business practices remain popular. They take a useful and needed service like on-demand transportation, that is currently underserved, and then make it frictionless and easy to use, all at a price point that's highly competitive. They tapped into a need of the customer, and met it. It's why in the traditional layout of a pitch deck that is presented to VCs by a startup, there are a couple of slides on things like "Customer Need" and "Pain Points".

So what would June have presented to VCs in this regard, to show the market need, huge potential for growth, and ongoing revenue? Well, I've sat here for a few hours trying to come up with the pitch that, like with Juicero, would make this product make sense, and I've failed. Here's the only thing I could come up with: One of the co-founders was the co-founder of Lyft. That's it. He previously co-founded a successful startup and even though it is not even in the vaguely same space, software/service rather than hardware, that's all that's needed. Everyone knows the hardware part is easy, and you just outsource that anyway.

Now, to be fair, they may have been pitching the larger play, in getting into "the connected home", and becoming a brand name like Nest, and therefore willing to pay an upfront cost of an expensive first product to gain the skills needed to iterate and improve - the long game, as it were. Even there I just couldn't see where the money comes in. However even if that's the play they've made a basic mistake, and that's in the outsourcing of the hardware.

In not building the hardware themselves, they clearly fail to appreciate the interaction of hardware and software, the necessary back and forth between the engineering teams. The adjustments, the compromises, the understanding of how things work together, are all key to building a product that meets a need in a cost effective manner. It's a common mistake from people with a software only background, when leading a hardware project, to "black box" everything like modules and view it as a Gantt Chart rather than as an interconnected system where feedback between the components is an integral part of the design and development phases. Now, even after $30 million in funding, they don't have the skills to do their next product themselves, it's going to have to be outsourced again. 

I can't blame the outsourcing company for taking the gig, after all, payment is not based upon the product actually selling, but rather satisfying the ego of a startup founder with millions of dollars of other people's money. I can't even blame the founders for taking $30 million, if it's offered. That VCs funded this without someone really looking at their business model is just stunning, but hey, hardware is hard, and the guy did co-found Lyft, so what more do you need?

All the actors in this play are just acting in line with the incentives. Put the money out there, and they'll play whatever part allows them to get a share of it. Without that money, or with different metrics for award of it, the world of $1500 toaster ovens might actually become one where there are products made that customers need.

And how well does the product work? To answer that I'll leave with this quote from a product review entitled "This $1500 Toaster Oven is Everything That Is Wrong with Silicon Valley Design".

Cooking has always been a highly personal, multi-sensory experience, where trial and error is the only way to become the all-star cook most of us know as grandma. But as I put the salmon on the table 40 minutes later than projected, I had no idea what I should have done differently, other than to never have used June in the first place.

Theranos News

Just a brief update on the ongoing Theranos story. Hopefully in a week or so I'll actually have the time to write something substantial on this again. 

First, Walgreens is suing Theranos for $140 million. Walgreens was the company that had the deal with Theranos to use their Edison blood testing for patients in their stores, and this deal was one of the key reasons Theranos were taken seriously. This is a major blow, and along with the investor lawsuit for near $100 million, and the eight class action lawsuits they have, puts them at good odds of all the money in the bank disappearing in settlements and legal fees. 

Then, Tim Draper, one of the original VCs to invest in Theranos, continues to defend Elizabeth Holmes and starts playing both the victim and sexism cards on her behalf. It's somewhat ridiculous at this stage, and I don't know if it signifies desperation, denial, or delusion.

Finally, another fantastic piece by John Carryrou on the whistleblower on Theranos - the 26 year old grandson of former Secretary of State (and Theranos Board Member) George Schultz. To summarise, he worked at the company and began to question the effectiveness, legality, and safety of what they were doing, reported his concerns up the chain within Theranos, got a beatdown from the COO, left, went to the authorities to inform them, and met with intense intimidation from the Theranos legal team. 

And what was his reward for his good behaviour? $400,000 of legal bills and lost contact with his grandfather. It makes clear that any excuses that the youth of a founder/CEO excuses them from understanding the ethical and legal consequences of their actions are nonsense, and that whether the person in charge is 19, 39, or 99, they are capable of knowing right from wrong. More importantly, though, is that this article should make clear the answer the question "Why are so few people whistleblowers?"

Quick Updates: Theranos and Energous

Annoyingly busy and unable to post in detail until later, however two key stories in the press in the last 24 hours. First up, Theranos, where a current investor is now suing the company. Partner Fund Management LP (PFM), who invested $96 million in Theranos in Feb 2014 claim that:

“Through a series of lies, material misstatements, and omissions, the defendants engaged in securities fraud and other violations by fraudulently inducing PFM to invest and maintain its investment in the company,”

Further

Elizabeth Holmes and a former executive deceived the hedge fund by claiming it had developed “proprietary technologies that worked,” and was close to getting regulatory approvals.

Who could have imagined a startup where the founder claims working proprietary technology, and vastly exaggerate its capabilities, when they have no such thing? Theranos, of course, plan to vigorously defend against the lawsuit.

Finally it seems someone in the VC community is acting on the best interests of their Limited Partners and looking to get their money out. It seems PFM, like me, don't believe Theranos' recent redirection has a chance of producing results and that they have better odds of recovering their investment through a lawsuit. It's a damning indictment of Theranos' plans, as looked at in purely monetary terms, PFM view the value they could ever gain as significantly less than the initial investment - lawsuits cost money and there's a less than certain chance of recovery. Essentially, they've calculated the costs of suing and chance of proving fraud are sufficient that compared to the expected value of the company it's better to sue.

Of course there's a potential cost to not suing too - it could be that the LP's are questioning PFM and there's a chance they'll sue PFM itself for not doing their due diligence in selecting the companies in which to invest. Better to prove that they were defrauded than bamboozled perhaps?

I'm trying to think of when this has ever happened before in this manner, certainly I'll be looking to see if PFM is just the first to rush for the exit to beat the stampede.

I'm hoping this is the beginning of a change where VCs take more responsibility for the companies they invest in, and as I've written in the past, they act to end the incentive for startups to act in unethical and illegal ways. Perhaps Boards of Directors will begin to take notice too?

Secondly, Energous. An interesting article on Seeking Alpha, where the author has looked through SEC documents detailing the CTO's share sales and found some interesting activity that they claim shows he's divesting his stock as much as possible. I've only read through it briefly, but will give some more commentary later on this, very damning if they are what they're reported to be.

The Emperor's New Clothes

A few weeks ago Nick Bilton of Vanity Fair wrote an article on one of my favorite companies, Theranos. "How Elizabeth Holmes' House of Cards Came Tumbling Down" is a fascinating piece, not because of any particular revelations but because it highlights so well the mentality and attitude among certain Founder/CEOs, that they simply don't play by the same rules as you or I, that the narrative of a company is far more important than the reality, and that this behaviour is both enabled and rewarded by VC and tech media.

There are a few points in the story regarding Holmes and Theranos I'll come back to in future posts, however one section in particular hit home for me. This one section of the article reminded me why I'm not a journalist, as in just over a paragraph, Bilton summarises everything about the Venture Capital/Tech Media/Startup ecosystem I've been trying to highlight in this blog, and does so in a way that almost anyone can understand:

While Silicon Valley is responsible for some truly astounding companies, its business dealings can also replicate one big confidence game in which entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and the tech media pretend to vet one another while, in reality, functioning as cogs in a machine that is designed to not question anything—and buoy one another all along the way.

It generally works like this: the venture capitalists (who are mostly white men) don’t really know what they’re doing with any certainty—it’s impossible, after all, to truly predict the next big thing—so they bet a little bit on every company that they can with the hope that one of them hits it big. The entrepreneurs (also mostly white men) often work on a lot of meaningless stuff, like using code to deliver frozen yogurt more expeditiously or apps that let you say “Yo!” (and only “Yo!”) to your friends. The entrepreneurs generally glorify their efforts by saying that their innovation could change the world, which tends to appease the venture capitalists, because they can also pretend they’re not there only to make money. And this also helps seduce the tech press (also largely comprised of white men), which is often ready to play a game of access in exchange for a few more page views of their story about the company that is trying to change the world by getting frozen yogurt to customers more expeditiously. The financial rewards speak for themselves. Silicon Valley, which is 50 square miles, has created more wealth than any place in human history. In the end, it isn’t in anyone’s interest to call bullshit.

The only thing I'll disagree with is the last sentence - it is in almost everyone's interest to call bullshit, just not those currently profiting from the system. The misallocation of society's resources, both in straight cash invested and the working efforts of thousands of the smartest and most talented people on the planet, harms us all. These events have impact beyond just the company and the investors - imagine during Theranos' positive publicity peak in 2015 a scientist promoting their genuinely amazing blood testing technology to VCs, that truly does everything they claim, yet does not meet the fantasy specs touted by Theranos. How well do you think they fared in the fundraising? Exactly. What life enhancing technologies may we have lost because investors demand founders willing to be flexible with the truth?

In the past, I've sat inside a company watching the CEO engage in a war of fantasy performance stats and delivery dates with a competing vaporware company, using the tech press to launch salvos of ever increasing capabilities. When the enemy returned fire with a further 'improved' product, there was panic at the top and demands made to engineering that our product get better or timelines be shortened - statements from those trying to be rational, such as "No. Their numbers are just as made up as ours.", garnered a mix of confused and annoyed looks.

Neither company has, to my knowledge, released a product since then and in part this is connected to these inflated performance promises. It may have been possible to produce a more modest and realistic package that engineering originally wanted to do, but demands for "Perfect. Now." tend to wreck the ability to build anything of quality.

Many people have no problem dealing with bullshit in their working lives, and in fact for many in the legal, marketing, and sales side of business it's an intrinsic part of their day (apologies to the ethical ones among those groups!). Some drink the Kool-Aid and believe, some know the reality but the paycheque keeps coming in and it's not too important anyway. With engineers though, it's different. Our ability to perform and deliver in large part depends on our ability to spot falsehoods and mistakes, the desire for things being 'correct', and our inability to lie to ourselves about the reality of the situation (at least as far as the technical is concerned).

I rarely see engineers quit over pay (except when large inequities are made very clear), but I do see them quit over death march projects or managerial destruction of a long term and rational approach to delivering a product. If they don't quit it's common to see engineers continue on despite the conditions, desperately trying to save the product in the mistaken belief that either they have some form of personal responsibility beyond their employment contract, or that they will ultimately be rewarded for their perseverance when finally things are done. To their own detriment, this can result in significant personal health issues due to the stress, depression that can take them years to recover from, or even in the case of Ian Gibbons, the Chief Scientist for Theranos, can tragically end in suicide. Investors and tech press laud the dedication founders have to their company, to the perseverance, but forget the sacrifices made by those who don't have a 50% ownership in the profits.

In reading this piece by Nick Bilton I realised that the internal divisions I have experienced in companies are often between those who believe or profit from the bullshit, and those who either cannot or will not. It's the common "C-suite vs Engineering" - and in almost every case the former 'win', at least until the point it all comes crashing down. Why? Because making today look better, even at the long term expense of a worse tomorrow, is most profitable for those at the top. This shows up whether it's salesmen pulling forward orders from future years, CEOs cutting R&D for future products to make the bottom line better, or founders and investors "putting the most positive spin on things" (to be polite) in order to sell on to a greater fool.

It looks like the federal government may be cracking down on abuses that have been growing over the last few years, and Theranos seems likely to be the precedent. In my opinion we'll be seeing a rash of prosecutions of startups by the SEC, FCC, FDA, and other regulatory agencies over the next few years, and some very large investments will become worthless. They'll put it off as long as possible, but once it starts to hit the pockets of the large investors, suddenly we'll hear that it is in the interest of everyone to call bullshit. Here's hoping that comes sooner than later.

How Is This A Thing?

When talking about what sort of companies get funding from VC, I have a saying: 

Even when you take into account that VCs will fund companies more pointless than you can imagine, VCs will still fund companies more pointless than you imagined.

In that vein, I was amused today to read about Juicero, a company that makes juicers (the things that squeeze fruit and veg and make glasses of juice), and was funded to what was believed to be a total of $120 million. Yes, $120 million. I know it's been covered earlier this year but somehow I missed it, perhaps I assumed it was an April Fool's joke and ignored it, but it's for real.

So what is it? It's a $700 juicer that you buy (yes, seven hundred dollars), and then in the same way you buy different coffee pods for a Keurig, you buy different types of juice packets which range up to $10 each (yes, ten dollars). Hey, pre-cleaning and chopping organic (of course) fruit then putting it in a non-degradable packet is hard work! Pop the juice packet into the juicer, press a button, and a minute later you have a glass of juice. Then you throw away the packet, nothing to clean. But wait, there's more. The packet has a QR code on it (those square, 2D barcodes) and the system reads the QR code to compare with an internet database (it's WiFi connected of course) and see if the packet is in date - if you're in luck the system will press the juice for you just right. If not, or your internet happens to be down, no such luck and the $10 you spent will get you nothing.

So the skeptic in me sees:

• A solution to a non-existent problem. This solves nothing. No pain point other than a bit of washing up
• Vastly more expensive and environmentally damaging than the existing method
• Multiple points of failure and unnecessary complexity
• At best serves a tiny demographic

Buying the most expensive organic pressed juice in Whole Foods (you know, stuff someone has pre-cleaned and chopped and put in a plastic packet) and putting it in your fridge would be cheaper than this, wouldn't need an initial $700 investment, and you could still drink it when you the WiFi goes down. It's the sort of thing that you'd ridicule an undergraduate student for in their final year "Entrepreneurial Studies" final project, or congratulate them for the best parody startup you'd seen. But it got funded. For $120 million. How?

Industrial Design

The system looks beautiful. Just look at that sleek Jony Ive style design, it's like an iPhone on your countertop, how could you not want that? That alone makes it worth $120 million. OK, you think I'm, joking here? One of the things I've observed in the last few years of watching startup funding is this: Never underestimate the value of the mock-up, it's about the most important thing to show when fundraising. Not the prototype, the mock-up (but be sure to call it a prototype).

As an engineer, I've been more the "show something working even if it's a bag of circuits and wires, cleaning it up later is the easier part". More fool me. What I've learned is that such demonstrations press the 'off' button with investors - instead, show a mock-up or better yet the Industrial Design (ID). Best if you can put it into their hands, but an "artist's rendering" works amazingly well too. Seriously, investors seem to lose any ability to ask questions about the actual product when they're handed a piece of cardboard covered in plastic with a logo on it. "Hey, look how cool this thing is! It's amazing! All the hard work is done, all someone has to do is all the engineering/user design, validation, and testing to make it happen!"

I can see this having been part of the pitch deck to investors, a cool image and saying some ID firm run by ex-Apple designers is on it, and they'll think it's 90% done. Just be sure to accidentally say "prototype".

Market Penetration

Next I can see the slide showing some data on growth in juice bars, which if you live in places like SF or on Main Street in Santa Monica, there seem to be one every block running a 'special' of "4 for $30". I used to sit in the bar or ramen place opposite and count how many went inside during the day. If it got over a couple in an hour it was unusual, I've no idea how they survived. However, if you've got too much money then you all friends know people who 'juice', it's a health thing, and $10 for a juice isn't ridiculous so that's all OK.

Then we get the market equivalent - the Keurig. They'll have some curves showing Keurig's rise to around $4 billion in sales in 2014, and a tag line such as "The Keurig for Juice!". What's not to love about it? They sell the hardware, but then get the lock-in on the juice packets and receive ongoing revenue from that. Even better, the QR code means it won't work with third party packets, and unlike Keurig's failed attempts to create such a lockin, the fact the system is internet connected is the way they'll ensure that it can't be bypassed. Thought it was stupid that there was such a point of failure? No, to investors that's a positive! 

It's not even a system where they buy on demand like Keurig, nope here you go on a subscription and you get your supply sent every week. Better not miss your juice intake for the day, it's your health after all. They'll have that hockey stick curve of 1000 sales in year one, 10,000 in year two, and then a million in years three and out, with the consumables revenue from all those sales building nicely to make this a billion dollar company in year 5. Who wouldn't invest in that?

Supply Chain

Next they'll show how they'll corner the market in the consumable preparation, buying in vast quantities from the organic farmers and driving down the price, getting further margins there. They'll probably be something in there that shows how they can shift the content mix in each packet to use the cheapest ingredients available at the time. Something of a logistical nightmare, but it sounds great.

An Impulse Buy

It seems they aim for the "give away the razor, charge for the razor blades" approach of Gillette - except in this case they "give away" the first part for ~$700. Not a necessity and hardly in the impulse buy category, I have a sneaking suspicion they initially targeted a lower price point than this telling the investors it would sell for the price of a Keurig, with an entry level product in the $100 to $200 range, then just utterly failed to hit it. Right now I can imagine they're telling investors something like "This is the premium version, we've got a plan for cost down for the regular version!" when this probably was the standard version. It won't be the first time a CEO has demanded a product with every feature, in a really short timeframe, and then been shocked at the cost. When you're looking at time, cost, and quality, you only get to pick two, and time is never on your side as a startup.

That $700 may even be a subsidised number (though they claim not), but regardless if you assume that their COGs is around 30% of the price then you're looking at parts and labor of more than what an equivalent product retails for. They had two years to get this going, and while supply chain can take that long, without anything exotic in the design, time was not a restriction in getting this made, they should have had time to Design for Cost. Instead, I suspect a series of changing demands, feature creep, and failure to plan before initiating hardware builds made it take longer than should have been.

The Founder

And here we come to the main event, the CEO, Doug Evans. If ever you have a True Believer who is absolutely invested in this product and actually believes in what he's selling no matter how crazy, this is it. He compares himself and his product to Tesla, and that his method of squeezing gets more Chi, life force, and vibrational energy out of the juice. (Wait, vibrational energy? Maybe it can charge your phone at the same time!). 

How can you not believe in someone who can lead and inspire like this?

“Organic cold-pressed juice is rainwater filtered through the soil and the roots and the stems and the plants,” he said. “You extract the water molecules, the chlorophyll, the anthocyanin and the flavonoids and the micronutrients. You’re getting this living nutrition. It’s like drinking the nectar of the earth.”

He had the "Tenacity, Resilience, Perspiration" needed to never give up, so loved by investors. He even had Domain Experience, having run juice bars before. What does it matter this was a electro-mechanical system, consumer product, software app, supply chain, and retail play, none of which he had experience of. At least he later realised what a huge job it was to get it to market:

“I was just naïve,” Mr. Evans said. “I was like Forrest Gump. I had no idea what it took to make a piece of hardware that could ship to consumers safely.”

It's a pity more technically inexperienced founders don't listen to advice from those who tell them their timelines are ridiculous and that there are massive technical and safety concerns that shouldn't be ignored. 

What The VC Sees
Now imagine you're a Venture Capitalist, looking for somewhere to put your money for a possible 10x to 100x return and make your fund profitable, making up for all the other plays that tanked. Do you laugh this "Juicero" out the room, or do you make a mental list of all the positives and evaluate the risk versus the potential returns? If you did that, here's what you might get:

• A dedicated True Believer Founder
• A simple tagline, easy to understand 
• A comparison business model that shows billions in revenue
• Profit on the product, ongoing revenue from consumables
• A 'hockey stick' revenue curve
• No new technology needed, it's really an execution play
• Digital lockout of third party suppliers
• First mover advantage

Honestly, I look at that list and think "I can see why someone invested" especially if you can get them salivating over owning a part of "Keurig for Juice" early on and that it's going to be $200 a pop. If you even think there's a 10% chance it could match Keurig's $4 billion a year in revenue, a few million invested actually isn't totally ridiculous. 

So when you pitch your awesome idea to a VC and they don't invest, and then that VC pours a ton of money into a juicer company for a product that no-one is going to buy, have a look at how your business model compares to theirs. 

On paper, Juicero ticks all the boxes and makes sense as a VC investment. In reality, it's totally dumb. Do you see now why this is a thing, and you're not getting funded?

Update - Here's a link to a great Youtube video doing a breakdown of the Juicero. TL;DR - No cost constraints lead to lack of careful thinking, so overbuilt and clearly losing money on every one, to be made up for with the ~$2000 per year pack subscription.

Disrupted: A Resonant Tale

History Does Not Repeat Itself, But It Rhymes

Mark Twain (maybe)

I finally managed to get some time off last week, and had a great time in Vancouver meeting up with an old friend, followed by taking a cruise back home. This was the first time I'd been on a cruise ship, and I can guarantee you it will also be my last. I have a hard enough time boarding an aircraft, with slow people who wander aimlessly, can't get out of the aisle, and are seemingly unable to follow even the simplest of instructions - however that's nothing compared to a cruise ship. 

Imagine 3000 people, from families to your local retirement home outing, trying to board one ship, all in the space of a couple of hours. While I have some sympathy for the cruise lines in trying to deal with all this, being herded like cattle from pen to pen is not what I consider a fun time. It didn't get much better once on the boat, but fortunately I had a couple of good books with me and I pretty much sat on the room balcony and read them through. The first was "Disrupted: My Misadventure in a Startup Bubble" by Dan Lyons.

"Disrupted" is a book that hit home for me, and I read it cover-to-cover in one sitting. Here was a person who had built his credentials through 'traditional' companies, a focus on high-tech, had looked on with incredulity through his career as the most ridiculous companies were funded then sold, and eventually jumped into that world only to learn that it's more ridiculous than you could have imagined, and that in the end you just can't stop being who you are. 

Lyons was a former tech journalist who had joined "HubSpot", a company producing software tools for "Inbound Marketing". This attempts to have the customer come to you, not the old fuddy-duddy approach of having farms of workers cold-calling from paper lists and reading scripts to grab a sale. HubSpot were "disrupting" the old way of doing business and receiving huge valuations based on that fanfare - yet behind the scenes were using those "boiler room" techniques to promote their own product, and appeared to be pushing the appearance of growth at any cost to ensure the money kept flowing.

HubSpot is also famous for its Culture Code, their set of rules for a workplace designed to attract and keep the best talent. When I first read it (along with the Netflix equivalent) I was really pleased to see the main themes (minus the touchy-feely bits) were what I had tried, as best I could within the confines of a larger company, to employ when I ran a small division selling high tech software. Sadly, it turns out they were more "aspirational" than "actual" and mostly geared to reducing company financial liabilities such as paid vacation. I'll be coming back to these Culture Codes in a future post.

Lyons' experience had both similarities and differences to mine. Being on the inside of a startup and watching the insanity is something I'd had to deal with myself, and there were plenty of parts where with a simple name change to the characters it could have been something that happened to me. On the other hand Lyons joined later in the company growth, where it was nearly $100 million raised with 500 people in the company, and watched more from the 'regular employee' viewpoint, whereas I had been there from pre-funding, developed large parts of the core technology, and was involved (at least as an observer) in most business decisions for a period, giving me some insight into the interactions with the investors. (I'll add this experience was at more than one company.)

One of the themes that's clear in Lyons' writing is that the ageism in HubSpot was rampant - the idea that "younger people are just smarter" and do better for the business, when in reality it simply means "too inexperienced to realise they're being taken advantage of" and both cheaper and disposable. Hardware engineering, compared to marketing, makes this business ploy almost impossible to pull off. Most hardware problems are so interdisciplinary, and require so much understanding of the technology, processes, planning, and the realities of development that it's really only achievable with experience and talent. They also require time to move through to completion, often four or more years, plenty for naive new hires to wise up. Generally, once they're put into a real world hardware development role, even the most capable and arrogant engineer quickly learns not just that experience matters, but the problems are so large that there's no way to solve it on your own - you have to work in a team, and know your role in it. That ageism, fortunately, isn't something I have really encountered.

Another aspect of his experience that doesn't match with mine was with the "Kool-Aid" drinking of his co-workers. At HubSpot, the young staff truly believed they were working on something world-changing, that they had a mission, and they were part of a glorious revolution, prophets of a new religion that it was their destiny to bring to the masses. It seems apparent from his writing however that the founders and leaders of the company knew exactly what they intended to do, and it was a cold calculated method to game the system and make the company look attractive for an IPO. 

If anything my previous experience has tended to the opposite, where the Board and "C" level are the Kool-Aid drinkers, the true-believers, who ignore technical reports that point to failures, issues, and problems, as they are just the work of "heretics", or incompetent/lazy engineers. The average engineer, however, is under no illusion as to the real status of the company and the work - if they are any good, then facts and evidence are paramount to an engineer. Measurements, numbers, statistics all matter more than perseverance and pig-headedness. Maths and physics don't lie or bend to management directives. 

If C-level directives fly in the face of sensible technical choices, it's noticed and questioned. Sometimes you accept a poor engineering choice due to business reality of cost or timing, but if it's purely fantasy and you're being told to accept an impossible/stupid engineering choice then it simply forms an "us and them" mentality. It creates an odd situation where the lunatics are running the asylum, one where the patients are all sane and know it.

Lyons on the other hand was the sole sane man in the asylum, constantly surrounded by the insane, with no-one to turn to and laugh with. You can tell from his writing that at some points he questioned his own sanity, and was it he himself that was wrong and out-of-touch? It chips away at his self-belief, which had already taken a hit due to his earlier layoff from Newsweek. The whole process is insidious, as by breaking their self-belief, the company culture prevents someone from the clarity of thought and confidence to simply walk out, leaving the person feeling trapped and powerless - which I've learned over the years is something a lot of bosses like to have in their employees. You want to scream "Just get out!" at him, and fortunately he does have some friends simply tell him that. 

The psychological turning point for him seems to have been landing the gig writing for the show "Silicon Valley", spending weeks talking and working with other sane, rational people and laughing at the insanity he was dealing in with his regular job. At that point, he regains his self-belief and it's just a matter of time before he leaves, but he does what always amazes me about abused staff and shows a remarkable professionalism even in the face of egregious behaviour by his management. He continues to work and deliver product until it all finally blows up, and resigns giving them plenty of notice, but unsurprisingly is "graduated" (fired) immediately (definitely familiar to me).

Where the book really meshes with my experience though is in the observations of the startup and funding ecosystem - the game whereby VC's and founders manipulate the metrics not to produce better product or to satisfy customers, but to garner the appearance of growth to inflate valuations, and sell on to a greater fool, be it another larger VC, or the general public in the form of an IPO. It's not about creating an effective product, or improving productivity, it's about manipulating the employees, the unquestioning tech press, and the investment analysts into keeping the charade going long enough that someone has put so much money into it that either it's not allowed to fail, or you've banked the gains before it collapses. To quote from Disrupted:

"The one thing people do not appreciate is that these companies are incredibly fragile. There is so much less than people believe... The whole thing is based on companies trying to achieve escape velocity before they blow themselves up."

The book resonated with me on two main levels - the first being that Lyons is our "everyman" in a bizarre world, and he reacts as a sane man should, though often questioning his sanity. He reminded me of the titular characters in "Life of Brian" and "Blackadder", simply trying to make his way through life and doing what he can in the weirdest of circumstances. 

The second, stronger, resonance for me is his tying of the experience to the startup ecosystem, pointing out that, like the financial crises of the past, these valuations and investments are based more on sizzle than the steak itself, and that it's impacting our society in significant ways. Chapters like "Glassholes", "Escape Velocity", and "The New Work: Employees as Widgets" are really where the meat of the story is - a small fraction of the book but highlight the insidious effect "The New Work" is having on all our lives. These chapters alone made it worth reading, and the humour of the rest keeps your attention - go buy it. 

I'll leave you with a final quote from the book that in a few sentences perfectly covers what I have been trying to put into words. I doubt I'll ever be able to phrase it better than this:

"I've been in the Valley a long time. As far as I can tell, nobody here ever feels guilty about anything they do. What I have observed from these guys is that they have a strong sense that they are moral actors. They believe very strongly that they operate with high integrity. They believe they are the most moral folks on the planet. But they are not."

These are the people who claim they are making the world a better place. And they are. For themselves.